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ABSTRACT A Leakage-Resilient Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (LR-CP-ABE) not only
supports the fine-grained access control to encrypted data but also guarantees the security of the data under
the side-channel attacks. However, the leakage rate in the existing schemes is low or related to the number
of attributes. It will make these schemes suffer from continual attacks. In addition, all of them almost not
consider the leakage of the users’ privacy and rely on the composite order groups which will threaten the
privacy security of the users and depress the users in practice. In this paper, we aim at solving the above
problems and propose a scheme with the improving leakage rate in the prime order group. In the proposed
scheme, an extension of the lattice-based trapdoor is used to make it achieve the maximum leakage rate
1 − o(1). Moreover, it achieves the anonymity which can protect the privacy of the receivers. The proposed
scheme can be reduced to the standard assumption-Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption in the selective
security model and resist the Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA security). At last, the performance comparisons
are given to confirm the efficiency and security of the proposed scheme.
INDEX TERMS Leakage rate, anonymity, ciphertext-policy ABE, the maximum leakage rate, CPA security.

I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing [1]–[4] is favored by users and enterprises
for its high speed, flexibility, low investment and reliable
service. However, its dynamics and openness also lead to
security problems, such as data security and privacy protection. Data leakage incidents have occurred frequently
in recent years. For example, on March 18, 2018, it was
revealed that during the 2016 presidential election, a company called Cambridge’s Analytica illegally used the personal
data of 50 million users obtained from Facebook to create
archives. Later, Facebook found that up to 87 million people’s
information had been improperly shared by the company.
And on May 20, 2019, TechCrunch reported that a database
of Facebook’s photo-sharing website called Instagram was
leaked on the Internet, which contained private information
such as phone numbers and email addresses of nearly 50 million users, including some stars and internet celebrities. Such
leakage incidents are fatal.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Petros Nicopolitidis

VOLUME 8, 2020

.

In dealing with the data leakage and privacy information
leakage of the users, public key cryptography technique has
occupied a decisive position in the information security system. However, the general constructions from the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and an Identity-based Encryption (IBE)
[5] are often not realistic or secure in practice. One of the reasons is their one-to-one design principle. And the more complex system which was called Attribute-based Encryption
(ABE) [6] came into being in 2005 as a one-to-many encryption mechanism. It not only ensures data security but also
supports expressive access control policies because attributes
acts as public keys and associate them with ciphertexts and
users secret keys. An ABE has mainly been classified into
two categories: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and CiphertextPolicy ABE (CP-ABE) [7]. The other comes from the sidechannel attacks, where the adversaries can obtain the limited
additional information about secret keys and other internal
states. These leakage information may make the existing
works be easily broken. Naturally, the Leakage-Resilient
Encryption mechanism was introduced, which ensured the
security of scheme under the key leakage attacks. To describe
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TABLE 1. Definitions of leakage models.

the amount of leakage bits that the adversaries can know
under these attacks, various leakage models are designed,
such as Only Computation Leakage (OCL) model, the Continuous Memory Leakage (CML) model and so on. The concrete information of the various models are shown in Table 1.
Now the Leakage-Resilient (LR) cryptosystem especially the
LR-ABE has become a research hotspot.
LR-ABE schemes give stronger security guarantees to the
sharing data than general constructions, but most of them
rarely pay attention to protecting the privacy of recipients
from access policies. After an encryptor uploads the specified
access policy to the cloud platform along with the encrypted
data, the adversaries can obtain the attribute information
contained in the access policy directly or through DDH test,
thus obtaining the sensitive information of the receivers,
which really poses a great threat to the privacy of the users.
For the purpose of better protecting users’ privacy and data
security, the concept of Anonymous ABE (ANON-ABE) was
introduced in [8], [9]. In ANON-ABE, the adversaries cannot grasp the meaningful information of the corresponding
attributes embedded in an access policy through testing and
other means.
A. RELATED WORKS
1) LEAKAGE-RESILIENT CRYPTOGRAPHY

Akavia et al. [10] firstly presented the BML model and
defined an attack model called ‘‘memory attack’’ that solved
the problem of [11], where they considered the amount of
leaked bits that the trapdoor one-way function outputted.
Subsequently, Naor and Segev [12] constructed a LeakageResilient Public Key Encryption (LR-PKE) scheme by utilizing Hash Proof System (HPS) that was not related to other
complexity assumptions and was as efficient as the underlying scheme. They also built two complementary schemes
based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and K-Linear
assumptions whose leakage bits could be approach the bit
length of private keys. Moreover, they constructed two LRPKE schemes which came from Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [13]. The corresponding leakage rates are 1/4 and 1/6
respectively.
In [14], Alwen et al. showed the details of LR-PKE/IBE
schemes under the Bounded Retrieval Leakage (BRL) model.
Additionally, a novel concept of IB-HPS was proposed.
94034

Then, they showed that a LR-IBE scheme was derived from
their IB-HPS. Afterwards, Chow et al. [15] introduced
the Leakage-Resilient IBE (LR-IBE) systems under static
assumptions in the standard model. Their proposals were
derived from applying the hash proof technique to IBE
schemes of Boneh-Boyen, Waters and Lewko-Waters. And
their three schemes achieves the leakage rate 1/3, 1/3 and
1/9 respectively in the CPA security model. Lewko et al. [16]
provided IBE, ABE and Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes
under the Continual Memory Leakage (CML) model
described in [17] and [18]. All of their constructions achieve
the leakage-resilience on the master secret keys and private
keys simultaneously.
In 2013, a new LR-PKE scheme was put forward by
Liu et al. [19] to solve the shortcoming of [20] that the
leakage parameter λ is linearly correlated with the length
of the plaintext lm . Specifically, the relationship between λ
and lm is described as λ + lm ≤ log p − ω(log κ), while
the number of leakage bits is λ ≤ log p − ω(log κ) in
the scheme [19], where κ represents the security parameter and p is a big prime that denotes the order of the
fundamental group. Then Zhang et al. [21] put forward two
schemes which tolerated the continual leakage in the standard
model. Both constructions of LR-CP-ABE and LR-KP-ABE
schemes achieve fast decryption and the cost of decryption
has nothing to do with the depth of the access structures.
In 2017, the improved LR-CP-ABE and LR-KP-ABE were
introduced by Zhang et al. [22] by employing the HPS to
ABE which were proved to be adaptively secure. In addition,
these two schemes overcome the shortcomings of most of
schemes that the leakage rate is not only related to the size of
the dependent group, but also depends on the leakage parameter of ñ. To protect the privacy of the receivers, the anonymous
LR-ABE was considered in the design process of [23]. The
recent works due to Li et al. [24], [25] were still not given an
ideal leakage rate since the best rate of them was 1/3 when
the depth of the hierarchy was 1.
2) ANONYMOUS ABE

Kapadia et al. [8] defined an ANON-ABE for the first time
which has the following four characteristics: (1) Realize the
data sharing between the data owner with multiple recipients
through a semi-trusted server, which avoids the connection
between the sender and the receiver. (2) Hide the plaintext
VOLUME 8, 2020
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TABLE 2. Performance analyses.

messages and access policies. (3) Any recipients cannot
know the information of the access policies. (4) Support
the non-monotonic boolean access policies. Subsequently,
Yu et al. [9] designed a scheme whose security could be
reduced to the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH)
assumption, in which the anonymity was achieved by hiding
access policy. Then two anonymous schemes were given in
[26]. But both schemes are based on inflexible AND gates and
only achieved partially hidden. The [27] solved the problem
of illegal sharing the keys among users, which could support user accountability by embedding additional information
specified by users. However, users must calculate again and
again to test whether they are legitimate users specified by
the encryptor in these schemes. It will greatly increase the
cost of decryption. So Zhang et al. [28] proposed a scheme
with decryption test in 2013, namely, adding a matching
operation with less computation before decryption phase.
The [29] proposed an anonymous scheme based on a prime
order group. In 2016, the [30] extended the ANON-CP-ABE
to the electronic medical record system to protect the users
privacy, in which the access structure was more expressive.
In 2017, the idea of Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) was
used to detect whether the attribute met the requirements of
legal decryption in scheme [31], where the calculation of
decryption was performed by the cloud server. Additionally,
the obvious difference between this solution and the previous
solution was that the list of coefficients {ωx } was embedded
into the ciphertexts without evaluation. The [32] proposed
an ANON-CP-ABE scheme that supports fast decryption for
Personal Health Record (PHR). The core technology of [29],
[30], [32] is to disclose the index of attribute names and the
attribute values are embed into access structures, so these
schemes only can partially hide the access policies.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

Following the above trend, we aim to solve the problems
of low leakage rate and recipient anonymity in the existing
LR-ABE and proposed a LR-CP-ABE scheme. The detail
contributions are as follows.
1) Higher leakage rate
Technically, the proposed scheme is based on the
Bounded Memory Leakage (BML) model (or Relative
Leakage model), in which the arbitrary information of
VOLUME 8, 2020

the private keys can be obtained and there is a restriction
that the total number of leaked bits cannot exceed λ.
From the viewpoint of security reduction, we are motivated by the LWE-based IBE [33] and the extensions of
it [34], [35]. Select randomly matrices A0 , A1 ∈R Zp2×l̃
and set masker keys as msk = hA0 , A1 i. The system
public parameters are set as pp = hgA0 , gA1 , B, gD i
l̃
2×1
where B ∈R Zl̃×
p and D ∈R Zp . The pp are different
from LWE-based constructions. In addition, the private
v
keys and ciphertexts are set as skvi,xi = g vi,xi and ci0 =
0

gǍi0 ·ω·z·F(ρ(i )) where i ∈ I and v() is attributes. These
differences make the proposed LR-CP-ABE realize the
maximum leakage rate 1−o(1) based the DLIN assumption. Table 2 shows some comparisons with others.
2) Recipient-anonymity
Anonymous encryption is an effective method to protect
the privacy of the recipient. It requires the adversaries
cannot obtain the information of the private keys from
the ciphertexts under the premise of possessing the
public keys. In most LR-ABE schemes, the sensitive
information about attributes in access policies can be
capture by DDH test when the adversary obtains the
ciphertexts, which will lead to the disclosure of the
user’s privacy. To address this dilemma, we consider
the implementation of the anonymity in the proposed
scheme.
3) High efficiency on prime-order groups
According to the recent articles, a pairing computation on prime-order groups is more fast than that on
composite ones, where ‘‘a Tate pairing on a 1024-bit
composite-order elliptic curve is roughly 50 times
slower than the same pairing on a comparable primeorder curve’’. In addition, the decryption cost in schemes
over prime-order groups decreases more than that over
composite-order ones. The proposed scheme is based
on prime order groups which is more efficient than the
available (refer to the Table 5).

C. ORGANIZATION

Arrange the remaining sections according to the following
way. The 2nd part describes some preliminaries, such as
basic notations, LSSS and DLIN assumption. The definitions
94035
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TABLE 3. Meaning of symbols.

and security model of CP-ABE under the BML model are
elaborated in the 3rd part. The 4th portion of article provides
the specific constructions and security proofs. The detailed
analyses are presented in the 5th section. The conclusion is
given at last.

1
l̃
0
Ab
Rk3 (Z3×
p ), b ∈R {0, 1}, b ← D(g, g )]− 2 | of distinguisher
D is negligible.
Definition 1 (Universal Hash Function): If for any x 6=
x 0 ∈ X, there is

Pr
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. NOTATIONS

In order to facilitate understanding the specific meaning of
symbols, a summary is given in Table 3.
B. LINEAR SECRET SHARING scheme (LSSS)

The specific meaning of linearity in the linear secret sharing scheme 0 composed of attribute sets S is explained as
follows:
• Secret sharing: Ǎ is matrix whose number of rows
and columns are l and n respectively, and this matrix
also named sharing-generating matrix. The i0th row of
Ǎ is connected with an attribute value ρ(i0 ) for i0 ∈
[l] by a function ρ. Select a random vector ω =
(s, ω2 , . . . , ωn )T ∈ Znp , where s stands for the secret
that the data owner wants to share, the l shares of the
ˇ i0 ∈ Zp is the share
secret s are expressed as Ǎω. (Aω)
0
for attribute value ρ(i ).
• Secret reconstruction: C ∈ 0 represents any authorization set, I be defined as I = {i0 : ρ(i0 ) ∈ C} ⊂
{1, 2, . . . , n}. In polynomial time, P
such a collection
{µi0 }i0 ∈I can be solved that satisfies i0 ∈I µi0 λi0 = s if
{λi0 }i0 ∈I are indeed valid shares of secret s.
C. DLIN ASSUMPTION

The original decision linear assumption says that given gx1 and
y
g2 , it is difficult to distinguish gx+y from GT , in which x,
y ∈R Zp and g1 , g2 , g ∈R G. For our purpose, the assumption
described in [34] is converted to given the matrix gA where
A ∈ Zp3×l̃ whose rank is 2 or 3 and the number of columns
satisfies the condition l̃ ≥ 3, it is hard to decide the rank
of A. That is to say, under the DLIN assumption, the
advantage |Pr[b0 = b : A0 ∈R Rk2 (Zp3×l̃ ), A1 ∈R
94036

$

h←
−HĨ

[h(x) = h(x 0 )] =

1
,
|Y|

where HĨ = {h : X → Y} is a family of hash functions, then
we say it is universal.
Lemma 1 (Generalized Leftover Hash Lemma [33]): HĨ =
{h : X → Y} means a family of universal hash functions and
f : X → Z is a family of leakage functions. The statistical
distance
1p
SD((h, h(T), f (T)); (h, UY , f (T))) ≤
γ (T) · |Y| · |Z|,
2
for T ∈R X, γ (T) = maxt Pr[T = t]. That is, if the right-side
of the inequality is negligible, h(T) is still random even if h
and f (T) are given.
Lemma 2 (Leakage-Resilience Random Subspaces [17]):
Let m ≥ l ≥ 4, p is a large prime, X ∈R Zm×l
p , T ∈R
m×2 and f : Zm×2 → Z. As long as |Z| ≤
Zl×2
,
Y
∈
Z
R
p
p
p
ql−3  2 is satisfied, then there is
SD((X, f (X · T ); (X, f (Y ))) ≤ .

D. DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODEL FOR
LR-CP-ABE UNDER THE BML MODEL

A CP-ABE scheme which is resilient to bounded memory
leakage attacks uses the four algorithms (Setup, KeyGen,
Encryption, Decryption) as constituents. A security parameter κ and a description of attribute universe set U are used
as inputs in the Setup algorithm, the corresponding outputs
are system public parameters pp and master secret keys msk.
pp is the common input of four algorithms. The KeyGen
algorithm inputs msk and an attribute value vi,xi ∈ S and
outputs a secret key skvi,xi . The Encryption algorithm takes
a message m, and an access structure 0(Ǎ, ρ) over the universe of attributes as input and the ciphertexts CT as output.
VOLUME 8, 2020
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We assume that (Ǎ, {Ii0 }i0 ∈[l] ) is implicitly included in CT ,
where Ii0 is the attribute name of the ρ(i0 ). In the Decryption
algorithm, the inputs are ciphertexts CT and the private keys
skvi,xi for vi,xi ∈ S, the output is a message m on the understanding that the attribute set S corresponding to the private
keys skS satisfies the access structure 0(Ǎ, ρ) embedded the
ciphertexts CT .
Next, a CP-ABE scheme with LR-IND-sAP-CPA security
and a scheme with ANON-LR-IND-sAP-CPA security can be
modeled as the following games completed by an adversary
A and a challenger C interaction respectively. The specific
process of games are described as follows:
Definition 2 (LR-IND-sAP-CPA Security): A CP-ABE
scheme is LR-IND-sAP-CPA secure with leakage rate ρm if
there is only a negligible advantage in the following game
for A.
•

•

•

Initialize: A sends the challenge access policy
0 ∗ (A∗ , ρ ∗ ) to C. Then (pp, msk) are generated by C
running Setup, the pp is sent to A.
KeyGen: C runs skv∗i,x ←KeyGen(msk, v∗i,xi ) for v∗i,xi ∈
i
{ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] .
Phase 1: A adaptively performs the following queries.
– KeyGen queries vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] : C returns
skvi,xi =KeyGen(msk, vi,xi ) to A.
– Leakage queries (leak, vi,x
ˇ i , f ): C returns f (skvi,xˇ i )
to A with the restriction that |f (skvi,xˇ i )| ≤ ρm
ˇ i ∈ {ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] maybe hold in
|skvi,xˇ i |, where vi,x
this queries, and f is a leakage function family.

•

•

•

Challenge: A sends two messages m0 , m1 (|m0 | = |m1 |)
to C, then C sends back CTb∗ ←Encryption(mb , 0 ∗
(A∗ , ρ ∗ )) for b ∈R {0, 1}.
Phase 2: A asks C some additional KeyGen queries
about vi,xi , where vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] . Then C answers
in the same manner as above.
Guess: A finally outputs a guess b0 about b. If b0 and b
are equal, A is successful.

Definition 3 (ANON-LR-IND-sAP-CPA Security): A
CP-ABE scheme is ANON-IND-sAP-CPA secure with leakage rate ρm if A has only negligible advantage.
•

•

•

Initialize: A sends the challenge access policy
00∗ (A∗0 , ρ0∗ ), 01∗ (A∗1 , ρ1∗ ) to C. Then C generates (pp, msk)
through Setup, A gets pp sent by C.
KeyGen: C runs skv∗i,x ←KeyGen(msk, v∗i,xi ) for any
i
v∗i,xi ∈ {ρ0∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] and v∗i,xi ∈ {ρ1∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] .
Phase 1: The following queries are performed adaptively by A.
– KeyGen queries (vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ0∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ) ∧ (vi,xi 6 ∈
{ρ1∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ): C returns skvi,xi =KeyGen(msk, vi,xi )
to A.
– Leakage queries (leak, vi,x
ˇ i , f ): C returns f (skvi,xˇ i )
to A. It is restrict that |f (skvi,xˇ i )| ≤ ρm |skvi,xˇ i |, where
vi,x
ˇ i ∈ {ρ0∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] or vi,x
ˇ i ∈ {ρ1∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] maybe
hold in this queries.

VOLUME 8, 2020

Challenge: Two messages m0 , m1 which has same
length selected by A are transmitted to C, then C sends
back CTb∗ ←Encryption(mb , 0b∗ (A∗b , ρb∗ )) for b ∈R
{0, 1}.
• Phase 2: A makes additional KeyGen queries about vi,xi ,
where (vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ0∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ) ∧ (vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ1∗ (i0 )}
{ρ1∗ (i0 )}. Then C answers in the same manner as above.
• Guess: Eventually, A outputs his guess b0 about b. A
will succeed if b0 = b.
The advantage of A in the above two games is defined as
Adv = |Pr[b0 = b] − 12 |.
•

III. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIONS
A. LR-CP-ABE WITH LEAKAGE RATE 1 − o(1)

The LR-CP-ABE consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen,
Encryption and Decryption. These algorithms are given as
follows.
Algorithm 1 Setup
1: Input: κ
2: Output: pp and msk
3: Fix l̃ ≥ 3
4: Choose a collusion-resistent hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and define
l̃
F(vi,j ) = [A0 |A1 + H (vi,j ) · A0 B] ∈ Z2×2
p

for each attribute value vi,j ∈ {0, 1}∗
5: Keep the system master secret keys
msk = hA0 , A1 i
l̃
where the matrices A0 , A1 ∈R Z2×
p
6: Return the system public parameters

pp = hgA0 , gA1 , B, gD i
l̃
2×1
where B ∈R Zl̃×
p and D ∈R Zp

Algorithm 2 KeyGen
1: Input: pp, msk and S
2: Output: private keys skS
3: for vi,xi ∈ S do
4:
Choose a random vector vvi,xi ∈ Zp2l̃×1 such that
F(vi,xi ) · vvi,xi = D
5:

Compute
vvi,x

skvi,xi = g
6:
7:

(1)

i

end for
Return the private keys skS as follows
skS = h{skvi,xi }vi,xi ∈S i

94037
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= A0 (w − Rv∗i,x y) + (A0 Rv∗i,x + (H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ))

Algorithm 3 Encryption
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

i

Input: pp, 0(Ǎ, ρ) and m
Output: the ciphertexts CT
Select ω = (s, ω2 , ω3 , . . . , ωn )T ∈ Znp , z ∈ Zp1×2 at
random
Compute e = ê(g, g)sz·D · m
for i0 ∈ [l] do
Compute
0

ci0 = gǍi0 ·ω·z·F(ρ(i ))
7:
8:

end for
Return the ciphertexts CT of the message m
CT = hǍ, {Ii0 }i0 ∈[l] , e, {ci0 }i0 ∈[l] i

= A0 w + (H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ))A0 By
= D.
It can be seen from above that the vvi,xi is correctly distributed
whose dimension is 2l̃ − 2. Furthermore, the dimension of
w is l̃ and the freedom of solution space is l̃ − 2 in Eq.(2)
l̃
since A0 B ∈ Z2×
p . Therefore, the set of above vvi,xi and the
solution space of Eq.(1) are equal in practice since there is
l̃ + (l̃ − 2) = 2l̃ − 2.
Theorem 1: The scheme is IND-sAP-CPA secure based on
the DLIN assumption, which is leakage-resilient with rate
1 − 3 − ζ for ζ -bits. The overhead of private keys and
2l̃

Algorithm 4 Decryption
1: Input: pp, CT and skρ(i0 ) for ρ(i0 ) ∈ S
2: Output: a symbol ‘‘ ⊥’’ or a message m
3: Compute the constant coefficient list {µi0 }i0 ∈I that
P
i0 ∈I µi0 Ǎi0 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the index set I
4: for i0 ∈ I do
5:
Compute ki0 = ê(ci0 , skρ(i0 ) ) = ê(g, g)Ǎi0 ·ω·z·D
6: end for
7: Compute
Y µ0
k=
ki0 i = ê(g, g)sz·D
Compute m = e/k
Return the message m or ‘‘ ⊥’’

pp = (gA0 , gA1 , B, gD ).
Set A1 as follows:
A1 = A0 Rv∗i,x − H (v∗i,xi )A0 B,
l̃ and B, R ∗ ∈ Zl̃×l̃ . Next, set
in which A0 ∈R Z2×
R p
vi,x
p
i

D = F(ρ (i )) · vρ ∗ (i0 ) ∈ Z2×1
p ,
∗ 0

h
i
∗
∗ 0
F(ρ ∗ (i0 )) = A0 |A0 Rv∗i,xi + (H (ρ (i )) − H (vi,xi ))A0 B .

After receiving the challenge access policy 0 ∗ (A∗ , ρ ∗ ), B
generates the matrice A1 instead of as above, suppose that
A1 = A0 Rv∗i,x − H (v∗i,xi )A0 B,
i

{ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ,

l̃ is the trapdoor
∈
Rv∗i,x ∈R Zl̃×
where
p
i
used in the security proofs. A1 is also random because Rv∗i,x
v

i

is random. Then we can compute skvi,xi = g vi,xi from pp
and Rv∗i,x for any attribute values (vi,xi 6 = v∗i,xi ) ∧ (vi,xi 6 ∈
i

{ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ) as follows: choose a random matrice w ∈ Zl̃×1
p
and a random vector y ∈ Zl̃×1
such
that
p
(H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ))A0 By = −A0 w + D.

F(vi,xi )vvi,xi
i
h
∗
= A0 |A0 Rv∗i,xi + (H (vi,xi ) − H (vi,xi ))A0 B
"
#
w − Rv∗i,x y
i
·
y

As a result, D is also uniformly distributed, where
vρ ∗ (i0 ) ∈R Zp2l̃×1 .
Game1 and Game0 are similar except that the ciphertext
component c∗i0 is randomly chosen. Then we prove the theorem by the following three lemmas.
Lemma 3: Game1 and Game0 are indistinguishable under
the DLIN assumption, ignoring leakage queries.
Proof: Suppose the ABE scheme can be broken by an
adversary A, then there is a simulator B who uses gA as input
l̃ is 2 or 3. After A announces
to tell the rank of A ∈ Z3×
p
the challenge access structure 0 ∗ (A∗ , ρ ∗ ), B sets the public
parameters as follows:

(2)

Obviously, it is not difficult to calculate gy from B, gA0
and gD contained in public parameters pp. We set vvi,xi =
h
iT
w − Rv∗i,x y y and use gy to compute gvvi,xi . This vvi,x
i
i
meets requirements because there are
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(3)

i

where

1) TRAPDOOR

v∗i,xi

l̃ log p

ciphertexts are 2l̃|S| and 2l l̃ respectively.
Proof: Let Game0 be the real attack game described in
Definition 3. However, some conceptual changes have been
made to generate the public parameters

i0 ∈I

8:
9:

i

A0 B)y

pp = (gA0 , gA1 , B, gD ),
l̃ consists of the first two rows of A, B and
where A0 ∈R Z2×
p
l̃
Rv∗i,x are randomly selected from Zl̃×
p and A1 as in (3). It is
i

obvious that gA1 can be computed from gA0 . Take note of


F(vi,xi ) = A0 |A1 + H (vi,xi )A0 B
i
h
∗
= A0 |A0 Rv∗i,xi + (H (vi,xi ) − H (vi,xi ))A0 B .
h
i
In particular, F(v∗i,xi ) = A0 |A0 Rv∗i,xi . B chooses vv∗i,x from
i

Z2pl̃×1 and sets D as in (3), so that gD can be calculated from
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gA0 easily. When A makes the KeyGen queries of vi,xi that
v
vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ ∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] , B computes and returns g vi,xi .
In the challenge phase, A sends two messages m0 , m1
(|m0 | = |m1 |) to B, in response, B randomly chooses b
from {0, 1} and sets y0 as the third row of A, and returns the
ciphertexts CT ∗ = hA∗ , {Ii0 }i0 ∈[l] , {c∗i0 }i0 ∈[l] , e∗ i as follows. To
simplify the formula description, the matrice
h
i
y0 |y0 Rv∗i,x + (H (ρ ∗ (i0 )) − H (v∗i,xi ))y0 B
i

is labeled by C, then
c∗i0 = gAi0 ωC ,
∗

e∗ = mb · ê(g, g)svρ ∗ (i0 ) C .
b0

b0

Finally, A outputs the guess of b. If = b, B thinks the
rank of A is 2. Otherwise, it guesses the rank of A is 3. We can
prove that B simulates the Game0 if rank(A) = 2; Game1 is
simulated when the rank(A) = 3.
Suppose that rank(A) = 2, then y0 and the first two rows
of A are linearly related, that is to say, there exist z∗ ∈ Z1×2
p
that makes y0 = z∗ A0 hold. Therefore
i
h
y0 |y0 Rv∗ + (H (ρ ∗ (i0 )) − H (v∗i,xi ))y0 B
i,xi
h
i
∗
∗ 0
∗
∗
∗
= z A0 |z A0 Rv∗i,xi + (H (ρ (i )) − H (vi,xi ))z A0 B
h
i
∗
∗ 0
= z∗ A0 |A0 Rv∗i,x + (H (ρ (i )) − H (vi,xi ))A0 B
i

= z∗ · F(ρ(i0 )),
it shows that (e∗ , {c∗i0 }i0 ∈[l] ) are the ciphertext components
in Game0 .
l̃
If rank(A) = 3, y0 is a random element in Z1×
p , namely,
d = y0 Rv∗ + (H (ρ(i0 )) − H (vi,xi ))y0 B is also a random
i,xi

element in Zp1×l̃ even given A0 , U = A0 Rv∗i,x + (H (ρ(i0 )) −
i
H (v∗i,xi ))A0 B and y0 . It is easy to find that
A · (Rv∗i,x + (H (ρ(i
i

0

)) − H (v∗i,xi ))B)

 
U
=
.
d

Therefore, the rank of A is full, if v∗i,xi ∈ {ρ(i0 )}i0 ∈[l] is selected
for any d, there will be a unique Rv∗i,x which makes the
i
equation true (the probability is negligible). That is to say,
d is as random as Rv∗i,x . Same with c∗i0 . As a result, under the
i
DLIN problem, it is impossible to make a distinction between
Game0 and Game1 .
Lemma 4: The advantage of A against the ABE scheme is
negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Proof: Let pi represent the probability Pr[b0 = b] of A
in Gamei for i = 0, 1, so that |p0 − p1 | is computationally
negligible. Moreover, |p1 − 21 | ≤ 12l̃ .
p

l̃ .
First of all, there is c∗i0 = gAi0 ω·cρ(i0 ) for some cρ(i0 ) ∈ Z1×2
p
Next
∗

e∗ = ê(g, g)scρ(i0 ) ·vρ(i0 ) mb
VOLUME 8, 2020

Let α = cρ(i0 ) · vρ(i0 ) and there is D = Fρ(i0 ) · vρ(i0 ) , then we
have

  
cρ(i0 )
α
=
· vρ(i0 ) .
F(ρ(i0 ))
D
In Game1 , cρ(i0 ) is a random element since c∗i0 is random,
l̃ and the two rows of F 0 are linearly
so that cρ(i0 ) ∈ Z1×2
ρ(i )
p
independent with a non-negligible probability 1/p2l̃ . In other
words, α is a random value even provided cρ(i0 ) , D and Fρ(i0 )
because of vρ(i0 ) is random. So e∗ = ê(g, g)sα mb is random
and |p1 − 21 | ≤ 12l̃ . Hence, the advantage of A attack the
p
ABE scheme successfully
1
1
1
|p0 − | ≤ |p0 − p1 | + |p1 − | ≤ |p0 − p1 | +
2
2
p2l̃
is negligible under the DLIN assumption.
Lemma 5: The proposed scheme is leakage-resilient.
Proof: Let f : Z2pl̃ → Z represent all leakage functions of Leakage queries from A, for the set Z. The purpose is to prove the distributions (cρ(i0 ) , cρ(i0 ) vρ(i0 ) , f (vρ(i0 ) ))
and (cρ(i0 ) , UZp , f (vρ(i0 ) )) are statistically indistinguishable,
it means that α = cρ(i0 ) vρ(i0 ) is indistinguishable with a
log c∗0

randomly distributed on the condition that cρ(i0 ) = A∗g ωi and
i0
the leakage information f (vρ(i0 ) ).
Now reconsider the indiscernibility of the two games with
leakage queries. Because B in the DLIN assumption can
generate vρ(i0 ) , Game0 and Game1 are still indistinguishable
even given f (vρ(i0 ) ). Moreover, cρ(i0 ) in Game1 is random
l̃ . Set h
2l̃×1 to Z .
over Z1×2
cρ(i0 ) (r) = cρ(i0 ) r maps r ∈ Zp
p
p
The function hcρ(i0 ) is universal due to Prcρ(i0 ) [hcρ(i0 ) (r) =
hcρ(i0 ) (r0 )] = p1 for r 6 = r0 . According to the Lemma 1,
the statistical
distance of the above two distributions is at
p
most 12 γ (vρ(i0 ) ) · p · |Z| where γ (vρ(i0 ) ) = maxu∈Z2l̃
p
Pr[vρ(i0 ) = u].
2) ANONYMITY OF THE SELECTIVELY SECURE ABE

Theorem 2: The ABE scheme above mentioned is ANONIND-sAP-CPA secure under the DLIN assumption.
Proof: The proof is similar to Theorem 1 and its specific
description is as follows.
Game0 be the real attack game as given in Definition 3,
Game1 is identical with Game0 except that c∗i0 of the challenge ciphertexts is a random value. The definition of Game2
is as same as that of Game1 besides e∗ in the challenge
ciphertexts is random. So the challenge ciphertexts of Game2
becomes random under the DLIN assumption, realizing
ANON-IND-sAP-CPA security. The concrete proof process
will be explained by the next two lemmas.
Lemma 6: Game0 and Game1 are indistinguishable under
the DLIN assumption.
Proof: B is similar to that of Theorem 1 except that
A1 = A0 Rv∗i,x ,b − H (v∗i,xi ,b )A0 B.
i
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TABLE 4. Efficiency comparisons.

TABLE 5. Efficiency comparsions.

FIGURE 1. Evaluation of efficiency.

in which v∗i,xi ,b ∈R {ρb∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] and b ∈R {0, 1}. Correspondingly,


F(vi,xi ) = A0 |A1 + H (vi,xi )A0 B
i
h
∗
= A0 |A0 Rv∗i,x ,b + (H (vi,xi ) − H (vi,xi ,b ))A0 B ,
i

and as before v ∈R Z2pl̃×1 and


D = A0 |A0 (H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ,b ))B · v.
For all KeyGen queries on vi,xi such that (vi,xi 6 = v∗i,xi ,b ) ∧
(vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ0∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ) ∧ (vi,xi 6 ∈ {ρ1∗ (i0 )}i0 ∈[l] ) from A, B
answered basing on the following equation
(H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ,b ))A0 By = −A0 w + D,
where H (vi,xi ) − H (v∗i,xi ,b ) 6 = 0. Besides, since
h
i
∗
F(ρb∗ (i0 )) = A0 |A0 Rv∗i,x ,b + (H (vρb∗ (i0 ) ) − H (vi,xi ,b ))A0 B

Proof: From the proof of Theorem 1, we can know that
sc ∗ 0 ·v ∗ 0
e∗ = ê(g, g) ρb (i ) ρb (i ) mb is random owing to the randomness of vρb∗ (i0 ) and
  

cρb∗ (i0 )
α
=
· vρb∗ (i0 ) .
D
F(ρb∗ (i0 ))
In order to simplify the explanation, let DEPEND be
express the matrix


cρb∗ (i0 )
l̃
∈ Z3×2
p
F(ρb∗ (i0 ))
whose rank is 2, this means that there is û ∈ Zp such that
cρb (i0 ) = ûF(ρb (i0 ))k̃ , where F(ρb (i0 ))k̃ denotes the k̃ th row of
l̃ of Game and Game is
F(ρb∗ (i0 )). Because of cρb (i0 ) ∈ Z1×2
1
2
p
random,

i

is unchanged, B is identical with that of Theorem 2. Therefore, it will not be described here.
Lemma 7: Game1 and Game2 are information-theoretically
indistinguishable.
94040

Pr[DEPEND] = Pr[cρb∗ (i0 ) = ûF(ρb∗ (i0 ))k̃ ] =

1
p2l̃

.

Lemma 7 can be proved, since Game1 and Game2 can be
distinguishable only when DEPEND occurs.
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IV. ANALYSES
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES

In this section, analyses on efficiency are given in
Table 4 and 5.
Let the order
Q of G and GT in scheme [16], [21], [22], [24],
[25] be N = 3i=1 pi , where pi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is large primes
of di (di = ci κ) bits. c, ci (i = 1, 2, 3) are any positive
constants. ñ denotes the leakage parameter. ε is a constant satisfied with 0 < ε < 1. m̌ denotes the number of minimal sets.
The number of elements in attribute vectors is represented by
k. Comparing our scheme with schemes [16], [21]–[25] in
terms of the length of private keys and ciphertexts, the time of
key generation, encryption and decryption in Table 4 and 5,
one can find that our scheme has advantage in private key
length and ciphertext length over the others. In addition, our
scheme has lower cost in decryption. From the analyses above
mentioned, our scheme is more practical than the rest of the
table.
B. EXPERIMENTS ANALYSES

We will analyze the experimental results by using the PBC
library. The experiment is on a 64-bits PC with Intel Core
i5-6300 CPU(2.4GHz) and 8GB of RAM. To achieve better
performance of leakage resilience, we set N in schemes [16],
[21], [22], [25] is a number of 1024-bits, the order p of the
proposed scheme is a number of 170-bits. To achieve the
balance of efficiency and leakage rate, we set ñ = 5 and l̃ = 3
respectively. And set l = 2 in the simulation of private key
length.
V. CONCLUSIONS

As an important encryption primitive, CP-ABE has attracted
much attention in the setting of key leakage attacks. However,
the leakage rate of most of the existing schemes is low and
dependent on the number of attributes. It is a challenge to
design a scheme with high leakage rate at present. In this
paper, we proposed a scheme with the leakage rate about
1−o(1) by using the trapdoor technique. The scheme is based
on DLIN assumption in the selective access policy model and
achieves anonymity which can protect the privacy of users.
In addition, our scheme is built in a group of prime order that
more efficient than the construction of composite order. How
to design a more efficient scheme is left as the future work.
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